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THE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS: A MELODRAMA IN FIVE ACTS 
, 
Keynote Address by Kevin C. Kennedyt 
On December 31, 2003, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
("NAFTA") marked its tenth anniversary. Another tenth anniversary in free 
trade also took place at the end of 2003, but this was an anniversary that went 
largely unnoticed, namely, the tenth anniversary of formal talks on a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas ("FT AA"). The FT AA was officially launched in Miami 
in 1994 at the first of four Summits of the Americas, and ten years later a 
renewed, albeit watered-down, commitment to completing those negotiations 
took place at the eighth and latest FTAA Ministerial Meeting in November 2003, 
again in Miami. Whether what occurred at the Miami Ministerial Meeting is 
cause for celebration or cause for frustration depends, of course, upon one's 
views about economic integration and globalization. For reasons that will be 
explained here, there is nothing to cheer about what took place at the Miami 
Ministerial. 
Background on the FT AA (and the Dramatis Personae) 
A proposal to integrate the economies of the countries in the Western 
Hemisphere was launched in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush in his 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. This piece of unfinished business was 
championed bi the Clinton administration and restyled as the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas. The goal of the FT AA, as articulated at the First Summit of the 
Americas held in Miami in December 1994, and renewed at the third FT AA 
Ministerial Meeting at Belo Horizonte, Brazil in May 1997, was a free trade area 
t Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law 
I See generally Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 LAW. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 945 (1996); Frank J. Garcia, 
"Americas Agreements "-An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997); Paul A. O'Hop, Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination 
of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 127 (1995); Carol Stump, 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 153 (1995); Ruperto Patino 
Manffer, The Future of Free Trade in the Americas, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 639 (1995); Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A Work in Progress, " 14 
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 493 (1994); David A. Pawlak, Learning from Computers: The Future of 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 V. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 107 (1995); Frank 1. 
Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. TNT'L 
L. 539 (1995); Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of 
the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAW. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 735 (1995); The 
Evolution of Free Trade in the Americas: NAFTA Case Studies, 11 AM. VJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 687 
(1996)(conference papers). The FTAA maintains a website at http://www.a\ca-ftaa.org. Other 
FTAA websites are at http://www.itaiep.doc.gov and http://americas.fiu.edu. 
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stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego by 2005? That far-sighted vision 
turned myopic at the eighth Ministerial Meeting held in Miami in November 
2003. 
The 34 heads of the democratic nations in the Western Hemisphere (all 
countries in the hemisphere with the exception of Cuba) launched FT AA 
negotiations at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, calling for the 
completion of a FT AA by 2005.3 The leaders committed themselves to integrate 
the patchwork quilt of bilateral and regional trade agreements (at least seven 
regional trade arrangements and more than twenty-five bilateral trade 
agreements) that exist in the Western Hemisphere.4 Upon its completion, the 
See Summit of the Americas, Declaration of the Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 
reprinted in 34 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 808 (1995); Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third 
Ministerial Trade Meeting, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil, May 16, 1997, Joint Declaration, 
para.2. 
To date, there have been four Summits of the Americas. The first was held in Miami in 1994; 
the second in Santiago, Chile in 1998; the third in Quebec, Canada in 2001; and the fourth-a 
Special Summit-in Monterrey, Mexico in 2004. Summit Declarations and Plans of Action are 
available at http://www.aica-ftaa.orgiSummits_e.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). To date, there 
have been eight Ministerial Meetings held in the following cities: Denver, United States of 
America(JuneI995); Cartegena, Colombia (March 1996); Belo Horizonte, Brazil (May 1997); San 
Jose, Costa Rica (March 1998); Toronto, Canada (November 1999); Buenos Aires, Argentina 
(April 200 I); Quito, Ecuador (November 2002); and Miami (November 2003). Ministerial 
Declarations are available at http://www.aica-ftaa.orglMinis3.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
3 See Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles (Dec. 1994), at http://www.ftaa-
aica.orglministerials/miami3.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2003)("We, therefore, resolve to begin 
immediately to construct the 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' (FT AA), in which barriers to trade 
and investment will be progressively eliminated. We further resolve to conclude the negotiation of 
the' Free Trade Area of the Americas' no later than 2005, and agree that concrete progress toward 
the attainment of this objective will be made by the end of this century"). 
4 See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM, 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U .S. LAW 250-51 (1998). The most economically important of 
the hemispheric regional trade agreements is, of course, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). For an overview ofNAFTA's legal obligations, operation, and impact, see 
generally NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 
H.R. DOc. No. 159, I03d Cong., 1 st Sess. (1993). The most recently concluded regional free trade 
agreement in the Hemisphere is the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The 
CAFTA countries are EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. See Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, Trade Facts, Free Trade with Central America, Summary of the US-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/ftaiCafta/ 
2003-12-17-factsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). Within Latin America, five major regional 
trade agreements have been formed: 
• The Central American Common Market ("CACM"), created in 1961, whose members 
include Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. See 
General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, EI 
Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Nicaragua, 455 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force June 4, 
1961. 
• The Andean Pact ("ANCOM"), formed in 1969, a subgroup of the Latin American 
Integration Association, whose members include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Venezuela. See Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 
Bolivia-Colombia-Chile-Ecuador-Peru, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910. 
Venezuela eventually acceded to the Agreement, but Chile later denounced it, effective 
October 30, 1976. See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, How the Andean Pact Transformed 
Itself into a Friend of Foreign Enterprise, 30 INT'L LAW. 811 (1996). 
122 International Law Review Volume 1, Issue 2 
HeinOnline -- 1 Int’l L. Rev. 123 2003-2004
The FT AA Negotiations 
FT AA will integrate a population of over 850 million people into a 13 trillion 
dollar market.5 
• The Caribbean Community ("CARICOM"), formed in 1973, whose members consist 
of the 13 English-speaking island nations in the Caribbean and Belize. See Treaty 
Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973,947 U.N.T.S. 17, reprinted in 12 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1033 (1973). 
• The Latin American Integration Association ("LAIA" or "ALADI"), formed in 1981, a 
multilateral preferential trade association comprising Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Treaty of 
Montevideo (1980) Establishing the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), 
Aug. 12, 1980, entered into force Mar. 18, 1981, reprinted in GENERAL SECRETARIAT 
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN TREATIES AND 
CONVENTIONS 353. LAFTA was restructured in 1980 and renamed ALADI. 
• The Southern Common Market ("MERCOSUR"), formed in 1991, another subgroup 
within the ALADI, whose members include Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, 
and whose associate members include Chile and Bolivia. See Treaty of Asuncion, 
March 26, 1991, reprinted in 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1044 (1991). 
In terms of its economic impact on Latin America, MERCOSUR is clearly the most ambitious 
and dynamic of the five Latin American RTAs. 
5 See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 251. The NAFT A parties wasted no time in pursuing 
the objectives identified in the Declaration of Principles. Immediately following the Summit, the 
leaders of the NAFTA parties formally announced that preliminary discussions on Chile's 
accession to NAFT A would begin in January 1995, with formal negotiations beginning in June 
1995. These plans were derailed, however, following the intense, and at times acrimonious, 
political battles in the United States over passage of NAFT A in 1993 and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements in 1994. Congress and the Administration both suffered from free-trade fatigue. 
President Clinton was unsuccessful in securing fast-track authority from Congress to negotiate 
Chile's NAFTA accession. See Stewart A. Baker, After the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAW. 765 (1993). 
Indeed, the stage had been set in part for Chile's accession to NAFTA prior to the conclusion of 
NAFT A when Chile and Mexico concluded a free trade agreement ("FT A") that entered into force 
January 1, 1992. Trade in most goods became duty free on January 1, 1998. However, Chile 
seemingly lost patience with Congress and President Clinton in their interminable quarrel over 
renewal of fast-track negotiating authority-now called "trade promotion authority"-and, instead, 
found new hemispheric trading partners. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 
1995, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 35 (USITC Pub. 2971 1996); Latin 
America Awaits a Call by Clinton, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 1996, at 6. First, Chile 
joined MERCOSUR as an associate member on October 1, 1996. Second, Canada and Chile 
concluded a bilateral FT A on November 18, 1996, that covers tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
investment, services (excepting financial services), rules of origin, customs procedures, emergency 
safeguards action, dispute settlement, AD and CVD actions, competition policy, labor, and 
environment. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FUTURE FREE TRADE AREA 
NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT MARKET OPENINGS 4-5 (1997); Tom Jennings, Canada-
Chile Free Trade Agreement. INT'L ECON. REv. 9 (USITC Pub. 3043 May/June 1997); Canada To 
Use Free-Trade Agreement With Chile To Press u.s. On NAFTA Accession. Chretien Says, 13 
Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 1782 (1996). 
The Clinton Administration could be criticized for squandering an opportunity to expand 
NAFTA by failing to add Chile as NAFTA's fourth member. The Bush Administration, on the 
other hand, successfully concluded, and the Senate approved, a Chile-US FTA on July 31, 2003. 
See Office of the US Trade Representative, Statement of u.s. Trade Representative Robert B. 
Zoellick Following Senate Approval of Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements, Press Release 
(July 31, 2003), available at www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/07. Although Chile was not formally 
admitted to the NAFTA trilateral relationship, with its web of FT As among the three NAFT A 
parties, Chile is de facto, ifnot de jure, a NAFTA party in all but name. Chile's eventual accession 
to NAFTA arguably was an essential step toward hemispheric integration. See Free Trade A rea for 
the Americas: Chile Is the Linchpin. INT'L ECON. REv. II (USITC Pub. 2934 Nov. 1995). 
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Act I: The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas 
The 1994 Miami Summit Action Plan called on the Trade Ministers of the 34 
FT AA participants to meet in 1995 to draft a more complete plan for FT AA 
negotiations and to meet again in 1996 to develop a timetable for future work.6 
To that end, Trade Ministers met in Denver in June 1995, and issued a Joint 
Declaration and Work Plan. The Ministers agreed to set up nine FT AA working 
groups-subsequently renamed "negotiating groups" at the 1998 San Jose 
Ministerial Meeting-on investment; agriculture; subsidies, antidumping and 
countervailing duties; market access; services; competition policy; government 
procurement; intellectual property; and dispute settlement. It is noteworthy that 
negotiating groups have not been established for labor and the environment, 
notwithstanding a call in the Miami Summit Action Plan to "further secure the 
observance and promotion of worker rights" and to make trade liberalization and 
environmental policies "mutually supportive." Several Latin American 
representatives, as well as private groups, voiced concerns over a US proposal to 
include the Labor and Environment Ministers in the FT AA process. Opposition 
to the US proposal was mounted on the ground that neither issue merits inclusion 
in the immediate action plan required to advance the FT AA process. Moreover, 
some participants argued that the proposed US language on labor and the 
environment departed from the more vaguely worded language on labor and the 
environment in the Miami Summit Action plan. Sources monitoring the pre-
Denver consultations reported that the United States agreed to soften its 
proposed language in order to achieve consensus at the June Ministerial. 
The June 1995 Ministerial Meeting in Denver failed to resolve two key points 
of disagreement about the future direction of FT AA negotiations: (I) the scope 
of the FTAA negotiations, and (2) the approach to be used to achieve the FTAA. 
Former US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and former Canadian Trade 
Minister Roy MacLaren both viewed the FT AA as a two-track integration 
process-the newly established FT AA negotiating groups as one track, and the 
deepening and strengthening of existing sub-regional trade agreements as the 
other track. Under this view, the negotiating group discussions and the existing 
sub-regional agreements would be mutually reinforcing and would ultimately 
converge. A middle approach envisioned FT AA negotiations modeled after the 
Uruguay Round "single undertaking" approach. This scenario envisioned a 
multilateral forum open to all 34 countries in which they would simultaneously 
negotiate all aspects of the FT AA and in which all participants would accede to 
all of the agreements negotiated rather than adopt an "<'1 la carte" approach as had 
been done in the Tokyo Round. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz 
Felipe Lampreia advocated an approach that would have widened and deepened 
existing sub-regional agreements. , The sub-regional accords would become 
6 See Free Trade Area/or the Americas: Chile Is the Linchpin, supra note 5. 
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"building blocks" for broader hemispheric economic integration along a path 
that ultimately would lead to bloc-to-bloc negotiations. But is this a "building 
block" or a "bloc building" approach? A constant concern about regionalism is 
that regional trade agreements ("RTAs") that create trade blocs may end up 
being trade diverting rather than trade creating because they close market access 
to more efficient producers from outside the bloc in favor of less efficient 
producers within the bloc. Advocates of the building block approach maintained 
that, by capturing the gains and building on the progress already made in the 
sub-regional trade blocs, FT AA objectives would be realized more quickly than 
under the Uruguay Round's single-undertaking model. However, critics of the 
"building block" approach argued that much time could be lost in efforts to 
harmonize a diverse group of sub-regional arrangements ranging from free-trade 
areas, such as NAFTA, to common markets, such as MERCOSUR.7 
At the March 1996 Ministerial Meeting in Cartagena, Columbia, the Trade 
Ministers agreed on "the importance of further observance and promotion of 
worker rights and the need to consider appropriate processes in this area, through 
our respective governments.',8 The lack of significant movement forward at this 
juncture can be explained in part by the incessant Brazilian-American sparring. 
While the United States would have preferred that an FT AA be a World Trade 
Organization ("WTO") "plus" agreement that would broaden the legal 
commitments made in the Uruguay Round, the early Brazilian model envisioned 
an FT AA that would first deepen existing sub-regional trade agreements before 
broadening them into an FT AA. The Brazilian vision would carry the day at the 
Cartegena Ministerial Meeting.9 As events would unfold, the Brazilians would 
ultimately win the argument over the future of FT AA negotiations. 
Act II, Scene 1: The 1997 Belo Horizonte Ministerial Meeting 
The glacial pace of FT AA negotiations was accelerated slightly at the 1997 
Belo Horizonte Ministerial Meeting in Brazil. In their Joint Declaration,1O the 
Trade Ministers reiterated: 
• the FT AA negotiations will be completed no later than 2005; 
• the FT AA will be consistent with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
7 See id. at 12. 
8 Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Ministerial Meeting, Joint Declaration Adopted 
March 21,1996, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/carta_e.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 
2004). The trade ministers also agreed to establish a Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, but 
postponed the establishment of a Negotiating Group on the environment. No such negotiating 
group was ever established. 
9 Brazil also objected to the negotiating groups using NAFT A language as FT AA draft 
language. See Brazil Gets Its Way, THE ECONOMIST, March 30, 1996, at 45-46. As two 
commentators have observed, this was a discouraging state of affairs. See Abbott & Bowman, 
supra note I, at 517. 
10 Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third Ministerial Meeting, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, 
Brazil, May 16, 1997, Joint Declaration, available at http://www.aIca-ftaa.org (last visited Jan. 25, 
2004) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. 
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("GATT") Article XXIV and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
("GATS") Article V on regional trade agreements; and 
• the FT AA will be trade creating, not trade diverting. II 
The 34 Trade Ministers also agreed on the following points: (1) decision-
making is to be by consensus, (2) an FT AA must be a comprehensive 
undertaking, (3) countries may accede individually or as members of an RTA, 
and (4) a Secretariat is to be established to support the negotiations. 12 As is 
explained below, the comprehensive undertaking goal of FTAA negotiations 
ultimately would be rejected at the November 2003 Ministerial Meeting In 
Miami. 
Act II, Scene 2: The San Jose Ministerial Meeting 
The participants in the FT AA negotiations held their fourth Ministerial 
Meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, in March 1998. 13 The 34 Ministers of Trade 
issued a joint declaration recommending to their respective heads of state that 
they formally launch negotiations on the FT AA at their Second Summit in 
Santiago, Chile. 14 The Ministers outlined the structure and organization of the 
negotiations into nine negotiating groups: market access; investment; services; 
government procurement; dispute settlement; agriculture; intellectual property 
rights; subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing duties; and competition 
policy. IS The Trade Ministers also reaffirmed their commitment "to make 
concrete progress by the year 2000. We direct the negotiating groups to achieve 
considerable progress by that year.,,16 Of course, 2000 came and went with no 
concrete progress having been made. Significantly, non-governmental 
organizations ("NGOs") representing labor, environmental, and academic groups 
were invited to submit contributions to the FT AA Ministerial Meeting to be held 
in Canada in October 1999. A Committee of Government Representatives on 
the Participation of Civil Society is responsible for receiving and distributing 
II Joint Declaration, supra note 10, paras. 1-2. 
12 ld. para. 5. The Ministers formally established a Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement 
whose terms of reference are to compile an inventory of dispute settlement procedures in the 
region, identify areas of commonality and divergence, and make recommendations on an FT AA 
dispute settlement mechanism. ld. Annex II. 
13 See US Int'I Trade Comm'n, Free Trade Area of the Americas, INT'L ECON. REV., at 1-5 
(Marchi AprillMay 1998). 
14 See Free Trade Area of the Americas, San Jose Ministerial Declaration, March 19, 1998, para. 
8, available at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/EnglishVersionlcosta_e.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
15 See id. para. 11. The nine negotiating groups meet at the following three rotating venues 
according to the following timetable: 
• Miami, Florida, from May 1, 1998 to February 28, 2001; 
• Panama City, Panama, from March 1,2001 to February 28, 2003; 
• Mexico City, Mexico, from March 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004 (or until the 
conclusion of the negotiations). 
16 See id. para. 18. 
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submissions from civil society in the FT AA process.17 The participation of civil 
society has been ongoing, but whether or not it will have any impact remains to 
be seen. 
Act II, Scene 3: The Santiago Summit 
At the Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, 
the 34 heads of state accepted the recommendations made by their trade 
ministers in San Jose and officially launched negotiations on a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas. IS The Santiago Declaration reiterates the negotiators' 
commitment to complete FT AA negotiations by 2005. The Declaration also 
states that the FT AA will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will 
constitute a single undertaking (i.e., will be an all-or-nothing package deal). The 
FT AA negotiations have been chaired on a rotating basis according to the 
following timetable: 
• Canada (vice-chair Argentina), from May 1, 1998 to October 31, 1999; 
• Argentina (vice-chair Ecuador), from November 1, 1999 to April 30, 2001; 
• Ecuador (vice-chair Chile), from May 1,2001 to October 31,2002; 
• Brazil and the United States (co-chairs), from November 1, 2002 to December 
31,2004 
The Intermission: Intervening Ministerial Meetings Before the 2001 Quebec 
City Summit 
Every play has an intermission, but the melodrama that is the FT AA 
negotiations was especially long. Fast-track negotiating authority had expired in 
1993. In the absence of a renewal of fast-track negotiating authority, the United 
States' ability to negotiate effectively was completely hamstrung. As a result, 
the three intervening Ministerial Meetings between the 1998 Santiago Summit 
and the 200 I Quebec City Summit were largely exercises in reaffirming the 
principles announced in the Santiago Summit Declaration: the FT AA would be 
balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and a single undertaking, i.e., an all-
or-nothing, package dea1. 19 As will be explained shortly, the 2003 Ministerial 
17 The contributions made by civil society in the FT AA process are available at http://www.alca-
ftaa.org/SPCOMMICOMMCS_E.ASP (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
18 See Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago Declaration, April 19, 1998, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.orglftaalsantiago/sadop_e.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). The heads of state 
also issued a Plan of Action, a body of concrete initiatives intended to promote the overall 
development of FT AA countries. See Second Summit of the Americas, Plan of Action, April 19, 
1998, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaalsantiago/sapoa_e1.stm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
19 See, e.g., Free Trade Area of the Americas, Fifth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Declaration of 
Ministers, Toronto, Canada, November 1999, para. 2 ("We reaffirm the principles and objectives 
that have guided our work since Miami, including inter alia that the agreement will be balanced, 
comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will constitute a single undertaking. We agree that we are on 
our way to completing our work by 2005."), available at http://www.alca-ftaa.orglministerials/ 
minis_e.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004); Free Trade Area of the Americas, Sixth Meeting of 
Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere, Ministerial Declaration, Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 7, 
2001, para. 2 ("We affirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since the First 
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Meeting was to depart dramatically from these consistently stated goals of the 
FT AA negotiations. 
Act III, Scene 1: A Draft Text Emerges (The Plot Thickens) 
In an effort to improve transparency, and at the same time to quell rumors and 
correct misinformation about what was being negotiated, it was agreed at the 
Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in April 2001 that a draft 
FTAA text would be made public.2o A preliminary first draft was published on 
July 3, 200l.21 Slightly revised versions were published in 2002 and again in 
November 2003.22 
Practically every line in the draft text is bracketed. Although I have not 
actually counted, I have heard that there are over 7,000 brackets in the draft text. 
There clearly is much work to be done and many differences to be bridged. A 
quick review of the text-if such a thing is possible considering that the text is 
several hundred pages long-raises many intriguing questions. The following is 
a small sample: 
• Chapter V calls for special and differential ("S&D") treatment of countries 
in the hemisphere "that takes into account levels of development and size of the 
economies of the Parties .... ,,23 But will S&D treatment mean extended 
Summit of the Americas, in particular, the basic principle of consensus in decision making within 
the FT AA process and the achievement of a balanced, comprehensive agreement that is consistent 
with the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization. We reaffirm that the result of the 
FT AA negotiations shall constitute a comprehensive single undertaking, that incorporates the 
rights and obligations that are mutually agreed for all member countries."), available at 
http://www.aica-ftaa.orgiministerialsIBAmin_e.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004); Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Trade, Ministerial Declaration, Ecuador, I 
November 2002, para. 5 ("We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work 
since the First Summit of the Americas, in particular, the basic principle of consensus in decision 
making within the FT AA process and the achievement of a balanced and comprehensive 
agreement that is also consistent with the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). We reaffirm that the result of the FTAA negotiations shall constitute a comprehensive 
single undertaking that incorporates the rights and obligations that are mutually agreed for all 
member countries."), available at http://www.aica-ftaa.orglministerials/quito/ minisce.asp (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
20 See Third Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Quebec City, April 20-22, 2001, available 
at http://www.aica-ftaa.org/ministerials/Quebec/declara3.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004)("The 
decision to make public the preliminary draft of the FT AA Agreement is a clear demonstration of 
our collective commitment to transparency and to increasing and sustained communication with 
civil society. "). 
21 See USTR Zoellick Says Publication of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Text Will 
Help Explain Trade Benefits, Office of the US Trade Representative, Press Release, Jui. 3, 200 I, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
22 Free Trade Area of the Americas, Second Draft Agreement, available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
regions/whemisphere/ftaa2002/secondtext.htm (last visited hn. 25, 2004); Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, Draft Agreement, FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.3 (Nov. 21, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftaa-alca.orglFTAADraft03IIndex_e.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Third 
Draft Agreement]. 
23 Third Draft Agreement, supra note 22, ch. V, art. 1.1. 
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transition periods for implementing obligations, as was the case in most of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, or will there be a substantive dimension as well? 
For example, under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture developed countries 
were obligated to reduce their export and domestic agricultural subsidies by 
percentages greater than those required of developing countries?4 
• Chapters VI and VII on the environment and labor, respectively, are 
completely bracketed, even their titles, meaning that provisions On environment 
and labor might not be included in any final agreement. An introductory 
sentence in both Chapters states that environmental and labor cornmitments 
"shall not be utilized as conditionalities or subject to disciplines, the non-
compliance of which can be subject to trade restrictions or sanctions.,,25 In other 
words, no trade penalties may be imposed for a country's failure to enforce 
domestic labor and environmental standards. 
• Chapters X and XI On rules of origin and certificates of ongm are 
disturbingly reminiscent ofNAFTA's labyrinthine rules of origin, including the 
nightmarish regional value methodologies of transaction value and net COSt.26 
These methodologies are truly the trade lawyers' revenge on the tax lawyers. I 
am hard pressed to cite a more efficient non-tariff barrier to trade adopted in the 
name of free trade. Will small and medium-size enterprises, both here and in the 
rest of the hemisphere, have the resources to comply with the record keeping that 
will be necessary to complete and substantiate a certificate of origin to the 
satisfaction of the US Customs Service? We shall see, but I am skeptical. 
• Chapter XVII on investment mirrors much of NAFT A Chapter lIon 
investment, but with important clarifications, including a provision that--except 
in rare circumstances-government regulation for purposes of public health, 
safety, and environmental concerns does not amount to an indirect 
expropriation.27 
• Chapter XXIII on dispute settlement is a hybrid of NAFT A Chapter 20 on 
government-to-government dispute settlement and the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). Like NAFT A Chapter 20, Chapter XXIII permits the 
complaining party to choose either the FT AA dispute settlement mechanism or 
the WTO DSU in cases where the responding country's measures violate both 
FT AA and WTO obligations?8 Dispute settlement panelists may not be citizens 
of any of the disputing parties, reflecting Article 8.3 of the OSU.29 Chapter 
XXIII would also create a seven-member, standing appellate body, again 
24 See WTO Agreement on Agriculture, art. 15.2. 
25 See Third Draft Agreement, supra note 22, ch. VI, second sentence; ch. VII, second sentence. 
26 See id. ch. X, art. 4. 
27 See id. ch. XVII, annex XX. 
28 See id. ch. XXIII, art. 8. Compare NAFTA art. 2005.1. 
29 See id. ch. XXIII, art. 13.2(c). 
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mirroring the WTO DSU. 30 
Act III, Scene 2: The Cancun Meeting of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
and the Fallout 
On September 14,2003, the fifth meeting of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
was held in Cancun, Mexico. As everyone knows, that meeting collapsed when 
developed and developing countries could not strike a compromise on the so-
called Singapore issues, i.e., trade facilitation, investment, competition policy, 
and transparency in government procurement. 3 I A subtext was the inability of 
the European Union and the United States to achieve any breakthroughs on 
agricultural subsidies or market access for agricultural goods. No consensus 
emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Cancun failure as to what the impact, 
if any, would be on the FT AA negotiations. At least one US negotiator offered 
the opinion, in Solomon-like fashion, that the failed Cancun Ministerial 
Conference "could cut either way" as far as its impact on the FT AA 
negotiations/2 while Deputy US Trade Representative Peter Allgeier stated that 
the 2005 deadline for concluding the FTAA was still achievable.33 One activist 
predicted that the Cancun failure would have a negative impact on the FT AA 
negotiations.34 Apprehensive over the negative impact that the Cancun collapse 
might have on the FT AA, the US business community urged US negotiators not 
to retreat from a comprehensive agreement in the FT AA negotiations. 35 
Participants in the FT AA negotiations, including key players Argentina and 
Brazil, warned-perhaps presciently, perhaps in a self-fulfilling prophecy-that 
disagreement over agricultural subsidies and market access for agricultural 
products (the same issues that have divided the WTO members not only at 
Cancun but also in the entire Doha Development Round) could also derail the 
FT AA negotiations.36 
In the weeks leading up to the FT AA Miami Ministerial Meeting in 
November 2003, Brazil made rumblings that the FTAA's goal of reaching a 
30 See id. ch. XXIII, art. 25. Compare WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, art. 17. 
31 See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Talks Crash as Developing Nations Balk at 
'Singapore Issues, ' 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1533 (Sept. 18, 2003). 
32 See, e.g., Rossella Brevetti, USTR Official Says WTO Failure Could 'Cut Either Way' for 
FTAA Talks, 20 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1555 (Sept. 18,2003). 
33 See Rossella Brevetti, Allgeier Says FTAA 2005 Target Date Is 'Achievable' Despite Cancun 
Failure, 20 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1625 (Oct. 2, 2003). 
34 See Gary G. Yerkey, Failure of WTO Talks in Cancun Likely to Negatively Impact FTAA 
Negotiations, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1583 (Sept. 25, 2003). 
35 See Rossella Brevetti & Michelle Amber, Businesses Urge Administration to Seek High-Level 
FTAA in Light ofCancun, 20 InCI Trade Rep. (BNA) 1627 (Oct. 2, 2003). 
36 See David Haskel, Mercosur Says Same Farm Trade Issues Causing Failure at Cancun 
Threaten FTAA, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1666 (Oct. 9, 2003). 
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comprehensive agreement would have to be cut back.37 Brazil argued that if the 
US position is accepted, and agricultural subsidies and antidumping rules are to 
be negotiated exclusively in the WTO as part of the Doha Round, then so too 
would investment, competition policy, and government procurement. Brazil's 
vision, at least as I understand it, is an FT AA agreement basically limited to 
trade in goods, i.e., issues related to tariffs, customs procedures, market access, 
rules of origin, and dispute settlement, with other issues-investment, 
intellectual property, government procurement, competition policy, and 
agricultural subsidies-being moved either to bilateral negotiations or to the 
WTO in the Doha Round.38 Matters came to a head in the running Brazil-US 
battle for the hearts and minds of the FT AA participants less than a month before 
the Miami Ministerial Meeting when Brazil accused the United States of 
"systematic arrogance" for allegedly trying to isolate Brazil in the FT AA 
negotiations. This was a truly melodramatic moment.39 The stage was now set 
for abandoning the comprehensive, single-undertaking fackage deal consistently 
sought by the United States in the FTAA negotiations.4 
Act IV, Scene 1: The 2003 Miami Ministerial Meeting (The Denouement) 
At the November 2003 Ministerial Meeting in Miami, the FT AA Trade 
Ministers apparently bowed to the inevitable, namely, a scaled-back FTAA.41 In 
a sharp departure from its earlier trajectory, the FT AA negotiations will no 
longer be a comprehensive, single undertaking as had been announced and 
reiterated over the previous nine years. Dubbed "FTAA-lite" by its critics, the 
US business community put the best face on the situation, observing that the 
outcome of the Miami Ministerial was better than a total collapse of the 
negotiations.42 
The Miami Ministerial Declaration left a few observers scratching their 
heads.43 For example, the Declaration at one point states, "The Ministers 
37 See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR's Allgeier Heading to South America To Inject New Life into 
FTAA Negotiations, 20 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1709 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
38 See id. at 1710; Ed Taylor, Brazil's Chief FTAA Negotiator Accuses u.s. Officials of 
'Systematic Arrogance, ' 20 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 1798 (Oct. 30, 2003). 
39 See Brazil's Chief FTAA Negotiator Accuses u.s. Officials of 'Systematic Arrogance,' supra 
note 38, at 1798; Ed Taylor & David Haskel, u.s., Brazil Harden Postions [sic} Over Scope Of 
FTAA, With Allgeier, Lula Standing Firm, 20 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 1799 (Oct. 30, 2003). 
40 See Rossella Brevetti, Allgeier Sees Question of Scope as Immediate Challenge in FTAA 
Talks, 20 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1844 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
41 See Rossella Brevetti, FTAA Trade Ministers Agree to Scale Back Frameworkfor FTAA at 
Shortened Ministerial, 20 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1960 (Nov. 27, 2003). 
42 See Rossella Brevetti, u.s. Chamber of Commerce Welcomes Miami FTAA Ministerial 
Declaration, 20 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 1962 (Nov. 27,2003). 
43 See Rossella Brevetti, Mexican Official Says FTAA Declaration Raises More Questions for 
Negotiations, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2001 (Dec. 4, 2003). 
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reaffirm their commitment to a comprehensive and balanced FT AA ... ,,44 in all 
nine negotiating groups. Two paragraphs later, however, that same Declaration 
states, "Ministers recognize that countries may assume different levels of 
commitments .... One possible course of action would be for these countries to 
conduct plurilateral negotiations within the FTAA .... ,,45 The scope of the 
FT AA negotiations have thus shifted from a single-undertaking approach to a 
two-tiered-or perhaps a multi-tiered-approach. The one prior commitment 
that was reaffirmed was to conclude the negotiations by January 1, 2005, with a 
new and earlier deadline of September 30, 2004 set for concluding the market 
access negotiations.46 
The details of the negotiations have yet to be worked out, but that process was 
scheduled to begin at a meeting of deputy trade ministers in Puebla, Mexico in 
early February, 2004 (after reaching an impasse, the Puebla meeting was 
recessed until March 2004).47 Exactly what the direction of the FTAA 
negotiations will be in the aftermath of the Miami Ministerial Meeting is 
anyone's guess. Does it mean a FTAA on trade in goods and services without 
any linkages to the other negotiating groups, such as investment or government 
procurement, which seems to be Brazil's position? Does it mean a FTAA with 
baseline commitments in all nine negotiating groups, but with trade benefits on 
goods being reduced if a country does not make significant commitments in all 
areas addressed by negotiating groups, i.e., a "you get what you pay for" 
approach, which seems to be the US position?48 Does it mean a FT AA with 
significant commitments in all nine negotiating groups, with obligations being 
phased in over time depending on a country's level of development but with all 
participants eventually assuming the same level of obligations, which seems to 
be the Canadian and Chilean position?49 As one Mexican official warned, the 
FT AA negotiators could find themselves "negotiating a process instead of a 
deal.,,50 
44 Free Trade Area of the Americas, Eighth Ministerial Meeting, Miami, USA, Ministerial 
Declaration, para. 5 (Nov. 20, 2003), available at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/MinisterialslMiamil 
declaration_e.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
45 Id. para. 7. 
46 See id. paras. 5, 13. 
47 See Joint Communique of the Co-Chairs of FTAA TNC in Puebla, Feb. 6, 2004 (co-chairs 
agree to recess the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting held in Puebla until March 2004), 
available at http://www.insidetrade.comlsecure/pdf5/wto2004_rh28b.pdf; FTAA Faces Uphill 
Struggle to Meet Miami Declaration Targets, 22 Inside U.S. Trade No.5 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 Mexican Official Says FTAA Declaration Raises More Questions for Negotiations, supra note 
43, at 2001. 
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Act IV, Scene 2: The "Special" Summit of the Americas (FTAA 
Negotiations Derailed?) 
Perhaps realizing that the FT AA negotiations were close to being put on life 
support, a "special"sl Summit of the Americas was held in Monterrey, Mexico, 
on January 13, 2004. The heads of state of the 34 participating countries 
engaged in a rather dull and hollow one-day meeting. In the words of Hugo 
Chavez, President of Venezuela, "We arrive, we greet each other, make 
speeches, sign a declaration, take some photos, smile, eat and go. ,,52 Those are 
hardly the words of someone truly committed to the FT AA process. Despite 
President Chavez's apparent disenchantment, the Monterrey Declaration does 
make a commitment to the FT AA, but puts an unbelievable spin on the outcome 
of the Miami Ministerial Meeting-a meeting that may very well have dealt a 
mortal blow to the FT AA process. The Monterrey participants issued a rambling 
and essentially vacuous declaration that had the following to say regarding the 
FT AA negotiations: 
We welcome the progress achieved to date toward the 
establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FT AA) and 
take note with satisfaction of the balanced results of the VIII 
Ministerial Meeting of the FTAA held in Miami in November 
2003. We support the agreement of ministers on the framework 
and calendar adopted for concluding the negotiations for the 
FT AA in the established timetable, which will most effectively 
foster economic growth, the reduction of poverty, development, 
and integration through trade liberalization, contributing to the 
achievement of the broad Summit objectives.s3 
My questions are these: Exactly what "progress has been achieved to date" 
after five years of negotiations? What "balanced results" are they referring to? 
What "framework for concluding the negotiations" was adopted in Miami? Is it 
significant that the Declaration fails to make an explicit reference to the January 
2005 deadline for concluding negotiations? Some observers think it is. 
Reportedly, there was a fight at the Monterey Summit over this very question. 54 
The Monterrey Declaration also dropped this ominous footnote: 
51 "Special" in this case means "previously unscheduled." The next Summit of the Americas 
was scheduled to be held in Argentina, most likely sometime in late 2004 or early 2005. See Third 
Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Quebec City, April 20-22, 2001 ("We ... have accepted 
the offer of the Government of the Republic of Argentina to host the Fourth Summit of the 
Americas."), available at http://www.ftaa-aIca.orgiministerials/Quebec/declara_e.asp (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2004). 
52 Loveless brothers, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17,2004, at 30. 
53 Special Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Nuevo Leon, Monterrey, Mexico, January 13, 
2004, available at http://www.ftaa-aIca.org/MinisterialsINLeon_e.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
54 See FTAA Faces Uphill Struggle to Meet Miami Declaration Targets, 22 Inside U.S. Trade 
NO.5 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
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Venezuela enters a reservation with respect to the paragraph 
on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FT AA) because of 
questions of principle and profound differences regarding the 
concept and philosophy of the proposed model and because of 
the manner in which specific aspects and established timeframes 
are addressed. We ratify our commitment to the consolidation 
of a regional fair trade bloc as a basis for strengthening levels of 
integration. This process must consider each country's 
particular cultural, social, and political characteristics; 
sovereignty and constitutionality; and the level and size of its 
economy, in order to guarantee fair treatment. 55 
One is forced to wonder whether or not this statement portends disaster, but 
trouble is definitely brewing. Within a week after the "special" Monterrey 
Summit, the February 2004 Puebla meeting of deputy trade ministers was 
threatened with cancellation after Brazil learned that Chile had organized a pre-
Puebla preparatory meeting to which only a hand-picked group of countries was 
invited - the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Costa Rica, all of which had 
supported a broad FT AA Agreement. 56 
The Unwritten Final Act: Brazil Has "Won," But Is It A Pyrrhic Victory? 
In the aftermath of the Miami Ministerial Declaration and the nearly-aborted 
February deputy ministers' meeting in Puebla, it is impossible to predict just 
what the outcome of the FT AA negotiations will be. It should seem fairly 
obvious to even the casual observer that the current negotiating climate is not 
particularly hospitable to a successful conclusion of negotiations. I will go out 
on limb and predict that the September 30, 2004 deadline for completing the 
market access negotiations will not be met, nor will the January 1, 2005 deadline 
for completing negotiations on other issues be met. Let me suggest a few 
scenanos . 
• If "[tJhe course of true love never did run smooth, ,,57 then what are the 
chances of Brazil and the United States patching up their differences? Frankly, 
not very good. In this scenario the United States or Brazil or both walk out, 
resulting in a complete collapse of the FT AA negotiations. This scenario is 
possible for several reasons, either standing alone or in combination. First, US 
frustration with Brazil may reach the breaking point, driving the United States to 
isolate Brazil in the FTAA negotiations. In response, Brazil's MERCOSUR 
partners circle the wagons; other countries, in particular Venezuela, that feel an 
allegiance to MERCOSUR or Brazil are tom; and the result is an FT AA 
55 See id. 
56 See Ed Taylor, Free Trade Area Meeting Set for February Cancelled Due to Dispute Over 
Invitation List, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 60 (Jan. 8, 2004). 
57 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM, act I, scene I. 
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collapse. Second, with the bilateral and/or plurilateral two-tiered course that 
apparently has now been set for the FT AA negotiations, the United States could 
conclude that there is little advantage in pursuing negotiations under FT AA 
auspices and instead opt for comprehensive, package-deal agreements with 
countries in the Western Hemisphere, either bilaterally (as in the case of the 
Chile-US Free Trade Agreement) or plurilaterally (as in the case of the CAFTA, 
the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement with El Salvador, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua).58 In late January, the United States concluded a 
free trade agreement with Costa Rica (which will join the CAFT A59); it has just 
initiated free trade negotiations with the Dominican Republic;60 and it has stated 
its intention to pursue free trade agreements with Panama, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Peru, and Bolivia in 2004.61 Counting its two NAFT A partners, that will mean 
free trade agreements with more than one-third of the nations in the Hemisphere . 
• The US Trade Representative ("USTR") stays the course, but Congress 
balks at an FTAA Agreement that is less than comprehensive. Mindful of the 
admonition, "Do not let the best be the enemy of the good," in this scenario the 
USTR swallows hard, holds its nose, and delivers a FT AA Agreement, but one 
that is limited to trade in goods and perhaps trade in a few services sectors. 
However, Congress reacts with displeasure because a "FT AA-lite" that covers 
only trade in goods and perhaps includes some modest openings in the services 
area would definitely fall short of Congressional objectives. The principle trade 
negotiating objectives established by Congress in the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (the "Trade Act of 2002,,)62 include improved 
market access not just for US goods, but for services and capital as well; stronger 
protection of intellectual property rights; transparency in ¥overnment 
procurement; and trade-related environmental and labor standards.6 Congress 
could send a strong signal that any FT AA Agreement that fails to meet the 
objectives laid out in the Trade Act of 2002 is dead on arrival, or it could 
actually disapprove a less-than-comprehensive FTAA trade agreement.64 The 
18 See Us. & Central American Countries Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement, Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release (Dec. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003112/03-82.pdf(last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
19 See US. and Costa Rica Reach Agreement on Free Trade, Costa Rica Will Join Recently 
Concluded Central American Trade Pact, Office of the US Trade Representative, Press Release 
04-03 (Jan. 25, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/01/04-04.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2004). 
60 See Zoellick to Visit the Dominican Republic January 14 as Free Trade Negotiations Begin, 
Office of the US Trade Representative, Press Release 2004-02 (Jan. 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2004/01/04-02.pdf(last visited Jan. 25,2004). 
6\ See Zoellick Announces FTA Negotiations With Four Andean Countries, Panama, 20 InCI 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1935 (Nov. 20,2003). 
62 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. \07-210, 116 Stat. 993 
(2002), codified at 19 U.S.c. §§ 3801-3812. 
63 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(I)-(6), (11). 
64 See Us. Chamber of Commerce Welcomes Miami FTAA Ministerial Declaration, supra note 
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latter would be a first, however . 
• The USTR stays the course, a 34-nation FTAA Agreement covering only 
trade in goods is successfully negotiated, and Congress blesses it. A patchwork 
quilt of bilateral and plurilateral agreements emerges on services trade, 
investment, and enhanced intellectual property protection. The international 
trade regime has been analogized to riding a bicycle: in order not to fall over, 
you have to keep pedaling. In this scenario, the bicycle theory of international 
trade triumphs. Considering that the FT AA consists of two developed nations 
and 32 developing countries, it seems probable that bilateral or plurilateral 
agreements on investment will be concluded in tandem with agreements on trade 
in services between the United States and several of its labor-rich, capital-poor 
neighbors to the south. The sticking points will occur in exempted sectors, e.g., 
state-owned public utilities and natural resources, and with regard to whether 
services trade negotiations should proceed on a negative list basis (Le., all 
service sectors are presumptively open unless expressly exempted, which is the 
approach taken in NAFTA) or a positive list approach (i.e., all service sectors are 
presumptively closed unless specifically listed in a schedule of commitments, 
which is essentially the approach taken in the General Agreements on Trade in 
Services ("GATS,,».65 Once again, Brazil and the United States are divided over 
this question, with Brazil preferring the GATS positive list approach and the 
United States preferring the NAFT A negative list approach. A related problem 
with such agreements could be their WTO-consistency. If whole sectors, such as 
agriculture, are excluded in the trade in goods negotiations, or entire service 
sectors are not part of a trade in services agreement, e.g., financial and 
telecommunications services,66 such agreements face serious problems of 
inconsistency with GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.67 
• On a variation of the previous scenario, FTAA negotiations are successfully 
concluded on trade in goods by the September 30, 2004 deadline, but other 
unresolved issues become the subject of follow-on FT AA negotiations a la the 
Uruguay Round "built-in" agenda on agricultural and services trade. This 
concept, floated by Brazil in 2003, envisions a FT AA on trade in goods being 
concluded by September 30, 2004, with more nettlesome issues being the subject 
of future negotiations after 2005.68 However, if the Doha Round moves forward 
37, at 1962-63 (Senator Baucus warns that any FT AA Agreement that does not address 
environment and labor standards will violate the Trade Act of 2002 and will be unacceptable to 
Congress). 
65 See Brazil's Chief FTAA Negotiator Accuses u.s. Officials of 'Systematic Arrogance,' supra 
note 38, at 1798. 
66 Brazil has stated that it does intend to make financial and telecommunication services part of 
any FT AA services negotiations. See Brazil's Chief FTAA Negotiator Accuses u.s. Officials of 
'Systematic Arrogance,' supra note 38, at 1798. 
67 For a discussion of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V on regional trade arrangements, 
see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 163-70. 
68 See u.s. and Brazil to Hold High-Level Talks Ahead of FTAA Mini-Ministerial Nov. 8-9, 20 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1843 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
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to a successful conclusion, then most of the issues that would be part of these 
FTAA follow-on negotiations-investment, expanded commitments in services 
trade, competition policy, transparency in government procurement-would be 
absorbed in Doha Round agreements in any event. 
Conclusion 
Just as NAFT A was viewed as a telltale for the ultimate success or failure of 
the parallel Uruguay Round negotiations, arguably the FT AA negotiations are a 
barometer of the ultimate fate of the parallel Doha Development Round. In the 
case of NAFT A, the feeling at the time was that if two developed nations, 
Canada and the United States, could not reach agreement on integrating their 
economies with a single developing country, Mexico, then the chances of 
success for the Uruguay Round as a whole were slim, given that several 
developed countries were attempting to do the same with nearly 100 developing 
countries. Similarly, in the case of the FT AA, if two developed countries, again, 
Canada and the United States, cannot reach agreement with 32 developing 
countries on a range of issues that are also on the Doha Round agenda, then what 
chance of success does the Doha Round have with its 146 participants, 80 
percent of which are developing countries? In short, the success or failure of the 
FT AA negotiations is a fair predictor of the success or failure of the Doha 
Round, so perhaps the FT AA negotiations cannot be allowed to collapse. 
Just as the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement was the foundation for NAFT A, 
NAFT A could have been a major step toward eventual hemispheric economic 
integration. Although no blueprint yet exists for achieving this ambitious plan 
for hemispheric economic integration by 2005,69 NAFT A itself contains an 
accession clause permitting accession by other countries regardless of location 
"subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between such country or 
countries and the [NAFTA] Commission and following approval in accordance 
with the applicable legal procedures of each country.,,70 
Some useful lessons for the FT AA negotiators can be drawn from recent 
experiences with economic integration in Asia and the Pacific Basin. There are 
many parallels between the two regions. First, the rapidly growing nations of the 
Pacific Rim are experimenting with new forms of integration while continuing to 
support th~ multilateral system. At the same time, they are forced to make 
accommodations among nations of vastly different size, structure, and level of 
development, as well as a growing number of sub-regional groupings, such as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area. 
Second, countries in the Asia-Pacific region, like their Western Hemisphere 
counterparts, hope to use economic integration to achieve important political 
69 See Craig L. Jackson, The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and Legal Harmonization, 
Am. Soc. Int') L. Newsletter (June-Aug. 1996). 
70 NAFTA art. 2204.1. 
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goals. The Asian experience suggests that, in an era of economic transition like 
the one the Western Hemisphere is experiencing, a more flexible, yet 
progressive, program of creating regional legal and economic institutions may 
prove to be the best path to integration.71 
In the absence of fast-track negotiating authority (or trade Eromotion authority 
as it is now called), FT AA negotiations were a futility. Now that trade 
promotion authority has been renewed,73 it is obvious that trade promotion 
authority has always been a necessary, but never a sufficient, condition for the 
success of the FT AA negotiations. In short, the FT AA negotiations may still be 
a futility. Regardless of whether a FTAA Agreement is negotiated, and 
regardless of whether Congress eventually approves such an agreement as 
truncated, as it will likely be, the existing regional trade arrangements-NAFT A, 
CAFT A, MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, CARl COM, ALADI, and the 
Central American Common Market-still offer the prospect of accelerating the 
pace of economic integration within the Western Hemisphere even in the 
absence of an agreement on a FT AA. 
71 See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 1, at 519-23 (an FT AA modeled more closely after APEC 
than NAFT A is preferable). 
72 See The road from Santiago, THE ECONOMIST, at 25-26, April II, 1998. But see Free Trade 
Area of the Americas OjJto Strong Start from Miami Talks, Office of the VSTR, Press Release 98-
94 (Oct. 22, 1998). 
73 See 19 V.S.c. § 3803. 
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